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NOTES
Medical Malpractice -
A Question of Insurability
I. Introduction
In 1971 the Argonaut Insurance Company signed an eight-year
contract with the Pennsylvania Medical Society to provide profession-
al liability insurance for society members.' Consequently, Argonaut
wrote policies for approximately twenty-five percent of Pennsylvania's
practicing physicians.2 Early in 1975, however, the company applied
to the Pennsylvania Insurance Commissioner for a 207 percent prem-
ium increase,' shortly thereafter announcing its intention to cancel its
Pennsylvania policies regardless of whether the increase Was
granted. 4  In response, the medical society sought to enjoin the
cancellation. 5 A consent decree followed, under which Argonaut
agreed to postpone withdrawal until a court could determine the
company's duty to honor the terms of its contract. 6 The rate hike
granted two days prior to this agreement, according to Argonaut, was
essential to the accomodation.7
1. Address by Irwin Benjamin, Esquire, President of the Pennsylvania Bar
Association, June 3, 1975.
2. Id.
3. U.S. REV., May 3, 1975, at 7. The effect of approval would be an increase
in the annual premium for certain Philadelphia specialists from $4,192.00 to $14,-
931.00. Id. at 10. According to Pennsylvania Insurance Commissioner William
Sheppard, however,
'Argonaut sustained 87 million [dollars] in underwriting loss during 1974
alone. In Pennsylvania, the company has demonstrated that its- cost of do-
ing business has been twice as great as its underwriting income. Without
a rate adjustment, the company's costs would soon become three times as
great as its income'....
Id. But see 0. Littleton, Background Facts Re: Argonaut Insurance Co., June, 1975
(unpublished memorandum to State Representative John Renninger, Minority Chair-
man of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives Committee on Consumer Protec-
tion).
4. U.S. REV., May 3, 1975, at 7.
5. Address by Irwin Benjamin, Esquire, President of the Pennsylvania Bar
Association, June 3, 1975.
6. Id.
7. U.S. REV., May 3, 1975, at 7. Walter Foulke, Argonaut counsel, was
careful to add that the accord was not an "unconditional guarantee," and that
legislative relief was necessary in order to bring other insurers into the field of
medical malpractice. Id. Late 'in May 1975 the Medical Protective Company, Argo-
naut's chief rival, also petitioned the Pennsylvania Insurance Department for a sev-
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The availability of malpractice insurance for Pennsylvania prac-
titioners was thereby guaranteed, but only for those who could afford
to pay the premiums. For beginning physicians and older doctors
commencing a gradual retirement program, the cost became prohibi-
tive. These rising costs alarmed not only the medical community but
the public as well.8 It was clear that the problem involved more than
the charging of exorbitant rates to produce excessive profits. If the
medical malpractice insurance business were a profit-making one,
companies would be entering, rather than abandoning, the field.
Pennsylvania's legislature was not alone in its consideration of why
malpractice insurance, unlike other types, is not a profitable business.
The answer to this question is that medical malpractice was an
uninsurable risk with which private companies had become unable
to deal.9 The legislature, thus, faced the task of either coping with
the risk as such or attempting to make it an insurable one. An insur-
able risk possesses two fundamental qualities. First, it must relate
to a fortuitous event-"the event or events described may happen
but not must happen . . ... 10 Next, the event insured against must
be certain as to time,1' place, 2 and amount of resultant liability.'3
enty-five percent rate increase. Address by Irwin Benjamin, Esquire, President of the
Pennsylvania Bar Association, June 3, 1975. The crisis, however, is not merely
statewide. Inflation, increased consumer demands, and a nationwide increase in the
number and severity of medical malpractice claims and awards have caused similar
situations throughout the United States. See Comment, A Four Year Statute of
Limitations For Medical Malpractice Cases: Will Plaintiff's Case Be Barred?, 2 PAC.
L.J. 663 (1971); 84 YALE L.J. 1141 (1975).
In 1970 eight percent more cases were opened than closed in Pennsylvania (10.6
percent nationally), evidencing a steady increase in the amount of claims made. U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COM-
MISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 7 (1973) [hereinafter cited as HEW REPORT].
Despite the steadily rising number of claims, the HEW report also indicates that in
1970 only one claim was asserted for every 226,000 patient visits to doctors. Id. at
12. Thus, although there may not be a disproportionate increase in claim frequency
compared with the number of people seeking medical treatment, the crisis persists
apparently due to the flat increase in numbers and of awards.
8. See NEWSWEEK, June 9, 1975, at 59, for an accounting of recent strikes by
health care providers.
9. Malpractice Insurance-An Emergency Case, 36 J. INS., 15 (1975).
10. 2 G. RICIIARDS, RICIARDS ON INSURANCE § 206, at 710 (3d ed. 1962). Risk
in insurance law describes the uncertainty surrounding the occurrence of a particular
event.
11. R. RIEGEL & T. MILLER, INSURANCE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 24-25 (4th
ed. 1959). A reduction in uncertainty is achieved by not only transferring risks, but
also by combining them. Id. at 24.
12. Id. at 25.
13. Id. at 24, 28-31. A more complete discussion of risk measurement and
combination as they are used to facilitate accurate estimations of probable loss may
be found in A. MOWBRAY & R. BLANCHARD, INSURANCE (5th ed. 1961).
This amount must not be of catastrophic proportions.14
The Pennsylvania General Assembly had little choice but to deal
with malpractice as insurable. 15 The success of its effort depends
upon how well medical practices and legal doctrines have been coor-
dinated to make the malpractice risk effectively insurable. This note
examines the three legal rules most criticized as contributing to the
uninsurability of the risk prior to Act 111,16 changes made by Penn-
sylvania's legislative solution to the problem, and the adequacy of
those changes in terms of increasing insurability while continuing to




The fortuitousness of incidents of medical malpractice and,
thus, the insurability of the malpractice risk can be increased if the
number of cases actually resulting in legal liability can be controlled
through the effective use of available legal defenses. One of the most
significant defenses is consent by the patient to the treatment given
him. The consent defense does more than protect the physician;
certain qualifications have been developed that protect the patient
as well.
Consent is a viable defense in most jurisdictions only if given
freely and voluntarily after disclosure by the physician of the probable
consequences of the proposed treatment. 17 The informed consent
requirement has been almost universally accepted as a necessary
means of protecting an individual's right to determine the fate of his
own body.'8 The standard and scope of the requisite consent, how-
ever, have been left to judicial determination. Two major theories
about the standard persist. A majority of states charge the physician
with a duty to disclose only what a reasonably prudent medical prac-
titioner would disclose under the same or similar circumstances. 19
14. R. RIEGEL & T. MILLER, INSURANCE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 25, 26-27,
31 (4th ed. 1959).
15. PA. CONST. art. I, § 11. The Pennsylvania constitution guarantees free ac-
cess to the courts. It was thus impossible for the legislature to deal with the crisis
in the same manner as that in which occupational injuries are compensated. This
is an often promoted alternative in other states that circumvents the problem of main-
taining sources of private medical malpractice insurance.
16. Act of Oct. 15, 1975, P.L. -, No. 111 (compiled at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40,
§§ 1301.101-.1006 (Supp. 1976)).
17. Cooper v. Roberts, 220 Pa. Super. 260, 286 A.2d 647 (1971). See also
Dunham v. Wright, 423 F.2d 940 (3d Cir. 1970); Bowers v. Garfield, 382 F. Supp.
503 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Gray v. Grunnagle, 423 Pa. 133, 223 A.2d 663 (1966).
18. Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972). "[A] medical
patient is a free agent, entitled-usually-to make even a wrong decision." Waltz
& Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 628, 642 (1970).
19. Natanson v. Kline, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670(1960).
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The medical profession in those jurisdictions, thus, has the privilege
of setting the standard by which its own liability will be judged.
Pennsylvania, however, takes the position that patients are not ade-
quately protected by a standard of conduct determined solely by the
medical community." The required disclosure, therefore, encom-
passes "all those facts, risks, and alternatives that a reasonable man
in the situation which the physician knew or should have known to
be plaintiff's would deem significant in making a decision to undergo
the recommended treatment."'"
This standard is now firmly entrenched in Pennsylvania law via
its incorporation into Act 111. 22 Informed consent is defined
as the patient's consent to treatment by a physician or podiatrist,
provided that prior to consent the patient has been made aware of
"the nature of the proposed procedure or treatment and of those risks
and alternatives to treatment or diagnosis that a reasonable patient
would consider material to the decision whether or not to undergo
treatment or diagnosis."23
From a legal standpoint the reasonable patient standard is supe-
rior. The consent defense recognizes both the patient's right to
determine freely the fate of his own body24 and the correlative duty to
answer for the consequences of his decisions. 25 Requiring the patient
to subordinate his judgment to that of the medical community sub-
verts the principle of personal freedom implicit in the doctrine of
informed consent. It imposes upon him the duty of accepting the
consequences of someone else's decisions.
Although theoretically sound, the patient's right to make his
own decisions based on information any reasonable man would want
to know does raise some practical problems. If the right is to have
meaning, the patient must be given more than mere information. He
must comprehend the risks the information discloses.26 Many courts
20. Cooper v. Roberts, 220 Pa. Super. 260, 267, 286 A.2d 647, 650 (1971).
21. Id.
22. Act of Oct. 15, 1975, P.L. -, No. 111 (compiled at PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
40, §§ 1301.101-.1006 (Supp. 1976)).
23. Id. § 103 (compiled at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.103 (Supp. 1976)).
24. Fala, The Law of Medical Malpractice in Pennsylvania, 36 U. PIT. L.
REV. 203 (1974); Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw.
U.L. REV. 628 (1970).
25. Capron, Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and Treat-
ment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 340 (1974).
26. Id. "Mhe duty is instrumental to the real concern-that the patient be an
educated and comprehending decisionmaker .... ." Id. at 415.
that use the reasonable patient standard have implicitly recognized
this distinction.27 A patient need not be given information with
respect to obvious risks-those that he has already undoubtedly
comprehended. Act 111, however, makes no reference to compre-
hension, only to information. Thus, in Pennsylvania even obvious
risks must be disclosed, but the physician has no duty to investigate
the patient's comprehension of the situation. Regulations adopted
pursuant to the Act2 should require that information given a patient
be divulged in a manner that a reasonable man, after having received
the information, will comprehend the risk. After proof by the physi-
cian of informed consent,29 the patient should be free to demonstrate
that the information given him was too complex for understanding
by a reasonable layman. Whether or not this was indeed the case
should be a question of fact to be determined by arbitrators or jurors.
The second dilemma that arises with the adoption of a reason-
able patient standard of disclosure is the choice between an objective
or subjective standard of materiality."0 Is it sufficient that the
patient merely testify that had he been informed of the dangers he
would have declined treatment? Or is an objective test preferable:
what would a prudent person in the patient's position have decided if
adequately informed of all significant perils? Although a subjective
standard of proof has appeal, pragmatic considerations have generally
forced the courts to adopt the objective test.
Since at the time of trial the uncommunicated hazard has mate-
rialized, it would be surprising if the patient-plaintiff did not
claim that had he been informed of the dangers he would have
declined treatment. Subjectively, he may believe so, with the
20/20 vision of hindsight, but we doubt that justice will be
served by placing the physician in jeopardy of the patient's bit-
terness and disillusionment. Thus an objective test is prefer-
able, i.e., what would a prudent person in the patient's position
have decided if adequately informed of all significant perils. 3'
27. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972).
28. Act of Oct. 15, 1975, P.L. -, No. 111, §§ 305, 307 (compiled at PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1301.305, 1301.307 (Supp. 1976)).
29. See notes 30-32 and accompanying text infra.
30. Capron, Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and Treat-
ment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 340, 408 & n.162 (1974). A risk is material in the
objective sense if a reasonable man in plaintiff's position would be likely to attach
significance to the risk or cluster of risks in deciding whether or not to accept the
treatment. Holland v. Sisters of Saint Joseph of Peace, - Ore. -, 522 P.2d 208
(1974). Because causation must be proven in any negligence action, including
medical malpractice, it must be demonstrated that disclosure would have influenced
the decision to undergo treatment-that the risk was so material as to have had a
probable influence on this decision.
31. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Capron,
Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and Treatment, 123 U. PA. L.
REv. 340, 408 (1974), citing Canterbury v. Spence, supra. Theoretically, as well as
pragmatically, extension of a patient oriented standard to the point of subjectivity
might come full circle and work against the right of the patient to make his own
decision. It is not an unfounded fear that a subjective standard might provide a
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Special circumstances in which a subjective standard is appro-
priate may exist, 2 but general reliance on the objective pa-
tient standard is both legally and medically sound. A law requir-
ing that patients be given information sufficient to allow a reasonable
man to use his own judgment assures patients that they will not be
trapped into accepting the consequences of decisions they never
made. This assurance should discourage delay and hesitancy in
seeking medical attention. Statistics demonstrate that most people
who are informed do not refuse treatment.3 3  Furthermore, im-
proved doctor-patient communications, even if forced, will inevitably
eliminate a portion of the poor public relations often cited as a 'cause
of the upsurge in malpractice suits. 4
Legally, the reasonable patient standard permits legitimate com-
plaints to be decided on the merits, rather than to be dismissed
through lack of available expert testimony. Such testimony is neces-
sary to identify a standard within the medical community, but in the
past has been unavailable because of the combined effect of the
locality rule and the conspiracy of silence. 35  Act 111 has codified
warrant for physician-investigators to reverse their patient-subjects' choices
by probing into the underlying, psychological processes and discovering
'ambivolences,' 'fixations,' or other unconscious elements short of the ex-
treme of legal incompetency.
Capron, supra, at 417 n.190.
32. A subjective standard has been advocated when the physician is or should
be aware of problems peculiar to any individual patient and when the patient is able
to demonstrate such an awareness. 1974 UTAH L. REV. 851. The same standard has
been deemed necessary in all cases in which experimentation and/or treatment of
catastrophic disease is involved. Capron, Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease
Research and Treatment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 340 (1974).
33. Capron, Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and Treat-
ment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 340, 428 & n.220 (1974).
34. Winikoff, Medical-Legal Screening Panels as an Alternative Approach to
Medical Malpractice Claims, 13 WM. & MARY L. REv. 695 (1972).
35. The locality rule is that portion of the definition of the physician's required
standard of care that obligates him to possess and employ the "skill and knowledge
usually possessed by physicians in the same or similar locality .... ." Incollingo v.
Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 274-75, 282 A.2d 206, 213 (1971). Thus, to establish the
standard of disclosure in a particular locale, it became necessary to secure expert
testimony from other physicians within the community. Doctors practicing in the
same area were reluctant and often refused to testify against a fellow physician and
friend. Belli, An Ancient Therapy Still Applied: The Silent Medical Treatment,
1 VILL. L. REV. 250 (1956); Kelner, The Silent Doctors-The Conspiracy of Silence,
5 U. RICH. L REV. 119 (1970). Demise of the locality rule in many jurisdic-
tions due to both "modern facilities of communication, extensive medical literature,
and the wide availability of consultation . . . which have made advances more
accessible to all health care providers," and the hardships of the conspiracy of silence
have contributed to more facile establishment of a standard for conduct in those
the reasonable patient standard, implanting it in Pennsylvania law
prior to detailed court discussion of the merits of subjectivity versus
objectivity." 6
In light of the insurance crisis it is of paramount importance that
the Pennsylvania standard increases the probability that medical in-
juries will indeed be fortuitous. Patients who have blindly submitted
themselves to another's control, if injured as a result of that submis-
sion, quite naturally will file suit to recover damages. Doctors can-
not mandate the taking of risks without suffering the inevitable con-
sequences. Under these circumstances claims are simply not for-
tuitous. On the other hand, if the law buttresses the patient's ability
to assume control, as does Act 111, the physician is relieved of a nat-
ural inclination to assume responsibility.17 The patient, in the exer-
cise of his informed consent, is less likely to be dissatisfied with the
physician if an undesired result occurs. The probability of suit is
greatly reduced. Consequently, the insurability of the malpractice
risk increases.
Because of a deficiency in Act 111, however, this result is not
fully achieved. The applicability of the standard must be broadened
if any increase in insurability is to occur. The definition of consent
contained in the Act relates only to services performed by a physician
or podiatrist. An amendment should be adopted to include other
health care providers so that the defense will clearly be available in
suits against them. This is essential for hospitals, against which the
largest recoveries will logically be sought. In addition, the permissi-
ble sources of information should be expanded by amendment in
the event that the physician himself does not make the disclosure
of risks to the patient. Without this modification each physician on a
surgical team is responsible for disclosure of dangers incident to the
portion of the treatment he will perform. Not only does this place
an unnecessary burden on each doctor, but it also could result in
misconception on the part of a patient who is unable to piece to-
gether all warnings. Finally, some clarification should be made for
cases involving minors and other incompetents to establish whether
existing rules of consent have continued applicability.
To insure that the standard is uniformly applied and subject
to effective administration, the regulatory powers given to the Admin-
jurisdictions that maintain a reasonable physician rule. Fala, The Law of Medical
Malpractice in Pennsylvania, 36 U. Prrr. L. REv. 203, 211-12 (1974).
36. Although the question was addressed only once in Pennsylvania prior to
passage of malpractice legislation, the objective standard for causation was used:
"Following the logic of Cooper, it is my opinion that Pennsylvania Courts, as several
other Courts already have done, would adopt the objective standard on the issue of
causation." Bowers v. Garfield, 382 F. Supp. 503, 506 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
37. Capron, Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and Treat-
ment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 340 (1974).
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istrator under section 305 of the Act38 should be used to establish
detailed consent forms demonstrating compliance with legal require-
ments. The form should first contain all elements outlined by the
federal government in the consent guidelines issued by the Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW). 39  These guides
require an explanation of proposed procedures and their purposes
and identification of experimental procedures, a description of dis-
comforts, risks, and benefits that can reasonably be expected, disclo-
sure of appropriate alternative treatments, and an instruction that
consent can be withdrawn at any time. 40  The form should also
contain the health care provider's promise to answer any of the
patient's inquiries and a denial of waiver of patient rights. Although
HEW declined to add a requirement of comprehension because this
was not previously required by courts,4 ' there is no reason for Pennsyl-
vania to refrain from doing so. While not explicitly required by
Act 111, comprehension is a necessary element in a reasonable
patient standard for informed consent and, therefore, standard forms
should provide some evidence of it.
42
The patient should also be supplied with information concern-
ing the adequacy of the hospital he is entering: equipment,
staff and technical facilities, projected postoperative care, and the
identity of all physicians participating in the treatment and their
experience with the proposed procedure.43  The burden of proof
should shift from the physician, after he has shown the signed consent
forms as some evidence of an informed consent defense, to the
38. Act. of Oct. 15, 1975, P.L. -, No. 111, § 305 (compiled at PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 40, § 1301.305 (Supp. 1976)): 'The Administrator shall prepare, print and
furnish upon request and free of charge, such blank forms and literature as he
considers necessary to facilitate and promote the efficient administration of this act."
39. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, THE INSTITUTIONAL GUIDE
TO DHEW POLICY ON PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS 7 (1971), as amended by 39
Fed. Reg. 18914 (1974); cf. 21 C.F.R. § 130.37 (1973). Although the require-
ments here were designed more particularly for subjects in experimental projects and
activities, the scope of their applicability can be widened to include more conventional
treatments.
40. An additional form should -be provided for withdrawal of consent, although
this writing should not be a prerequisite to withdrawal.
41. 39 Fed. Reg. 30649 (1974) (declining to amend 45 C.F.R. § 46.3(c)
(1974)).
42. See Capron, Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and
Treatment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 340, 416 n.188 (1974), citing Miller & Willner, A
Suggestion for Promoting Free and Informed Consent, 290 NEW ENG. J. MED. 964
(1974) (suggesting a means through which comprehension may be increased and
measured).
43. Lachman, Informed Consent-The Patient's Right to Know, VI THE
BARRISTER 1, 5 (1975).
plaintiff, who must then rebut the presumption of consent that would
arise from a showing of signed forms." It should be his burden to
demonstrate that the consent did not meet the required standard. If
this much is proven, the burden should return to the physician to
show that the case falls under a statutory exception to the consent
requirement.
B. The Exceptions
Act 111 contains two exceptions to the informed consent re-
quirement.45 The first excuses the physician in the event an emer-
gency prevents consultation with the patient before treatment. The
second, known as the therapeutic exception, allows a physician to
withhold information from a patient if it can be established by a
preponderance of the evidence "that furnishing the information in
question to the patient would have resulted in a seriously adverse
effect on the patient or on the therapeutic process to the material
detriment of the patient's health."4 6 Theoretically, exceptions should
be permissible in unusual circumstances when the patient is unable to
exercise his freedom of choice. The law in these cases is not taking
away any right because none exists.4 7 It is necessary to circumscribe
carefully all other exceptions so that no rights are compromised
absent medical justification. The Pennsylvania legislation has failed
in this respect in its enactment of a therapeutic privilege.
44. H.B. 1367, P.N. 2055, Pa. Gen. Assem., 159th Sess. (1975) specified that
the requisite consent to treatment be "freely given." The senate-amended version of
the same bill, id. P.N. 2273, struck these words. It is recommended that an amend-
ment be proposed to reinstate this phrase in order that patients may be protected
against abuse of procedures designed to insure information and comprehension.
45. Act of Oct. 15, 1975, P.L. -, No. 111, § 103 (compiled at PA. STAT. Ar.
tit. 40, § 1301.103 (Supp. 1976)):
No physician or podiatrist shall be liable for a failure to obtain an in-
formed consent in the event of an emergency which prevents consulting the
patient. No physician or podiatrist shall be liable for failure to obtain an
informed consent if it is established by a preponderance of the evidence that
furnishing the information in question to the patient would have resulted
in a seriously adverse effect on the patient or on the therapeutic process
to the material detriment of the patient's health.
46. Id.; see note 32 and accompanying text supra. In the past it was doubtful
that Pennsylvania courts would consider this a valid exception.
Despite the presence .... of dicta in the Pennsylvania cases which
may be read as precluding the availability of this doctrine, it has never been
discussed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, nor have the facts of any of
the Pennsylvania cases raised the issue squarely.
Fala, The Law of Medical Malpractice in Pennsylvania, 36 U. Prrr. L. REv. 203, 251
(1974). Fala does note that other authors have suggested that some form of the
exception will ultimately be recognized in Pennsylvania. Id. at 251 n.246.
47. The law will generally not permit the weaker party in a transaction to
abandon basic principles of individual freedom because choices made following such
an abandonment are not the result of "the unfettered exercise of rational choice."
Capron, Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and Treatment, 123 U.
PA. L. REv. 340, 370 & n.73 (1974). When the free exercise of this right is impossi-
ble, however, it is submitted that the law can remove the right and remain consistent
with principles of freedom to choose one's own destiny.
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The object of the therapeutic exception is to allow a physi-
cian to withhold information when the patient's health, upon
hearing that information, will be so affected by the news that he will
be unable to exercise his free will.48  Unfortunately, the scope of the
therapeutic privilege has been left open. Further guidance is essen-
tial if this new rule is to be applied uniformly by arbitrators and
jurors.4 9 Regulations must be promulgated pursuant to the Act5 ° to
circumscribe the privilege narrowly so that physicians cannot use it to
evade their duty to inform by substituting after-the-fact rationaliza-
tions for failure to disclose and to transfer control to the patient.51
Because malpractice is usually viewed as a negligence action, the
concept of duty is important. It implicitly limits the scope of the
therapeutic privilege to situations in which the withholding of infor-
mation will diminish the risk of harm.52 In informed consent juris-
dictions the physician's duties are twofold: he must not harm
his patient and he must inform the patient of the possible risks
entailed by treatment. The patient, however, still possesses the
right to forego treatment or even cure if it entails what for him
are intolerable consequences or risks, however warped or per-
verted his sense of values may be in the eyes of the medical
profession, or even of the community, so long as any distortion
falls short of what the law regards as incompetency .... 53
Therefore, the therapeutic privilege does not extend to the situation in
which disclosure will cause the patient to forego what the physician
considers prudent treatment. The only justifiable exception occurs
when the disclosure itself will have an adverse effect on the patient's
health.
48. The emergency exception has the same justification.
49. See note 34 supra. There is no Pennsylvania case law on the subject that
could aid either a lay arbitrator or a thoroughly researched judge in determining the
circumstances in which the privilege would apply. See Capron, Informed Consent in
Catastrophic Disease Research and Treatment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 340, 412-13 n.176
(1974).
50. See note 12 supra.
51. Capron, Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and Treat-
ment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 340, 412 n.176 (1974); Comment, Informed Consent: The
Illusion of Patient Choice, 23 EMORY L.J. 503 (1974). "[C]onsiderable de facto
substitution of the physician's choice of treatment for that of the patient can be
accomplished by invoking the therapeutic privilege." Id.
52. Capron, Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and Treat-
ment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 340, 412 n.176 (1974).
53. Id. The privilege cannot remain consistent with the patient's right to
determine his own fate if it is permitted to be extended so that a physician can legally
intrude upon a patient's right to make a wrong decision. Certain courts, however,
have limited the patient's right through use of a state interest argument. See, e.g., In
re Osborne, 291 A.2d 372 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
Although the physician's privilege of nondisclosure is very lim-
ited, the wording in Act 111 does not make this sufficiently
clear. In other jurisdictions with similar language the utility of the
therapeutic privilege "as a mere exception has been seriously jeopar-
dized both by the frequency of its application and the tendency of the
courts to view its requirements as elastic . . . . To avoid this
result in Pennsylvania, precise statutory and regulatory restrictions
should be incorporated into the Act.55 Only then will the privilege be
consistent with personal rights and a workable informed consent
defense.
The privilege should be limited explicitly to situations in
which the mere fact of disclosure will have an adverse effect on health.
Even in these infrequent circumstances the physician should still
possess the duty to disclose all information that is not in itself likely
to cause a dangerous reaction in the patient.56 The patient retains
his power to refuse treatment, therefore, if the decision can be made
on the basis of nonharmful information.
Therapeutic privilege should be an affirmative defense, the stan-
dard of proof centering on the probable consequences of disclosure to
a reasonable man in the plaintiff's condition, unless the physician can
prove an unusual circumstance in the particular case that justifies his
actions. This standard is consistent with the doctor's duty to disclose
more than the reasonable patient would deem material if he knows of
sensitivities peculiar to the patient. Only through explicit circum-
scription can therapeutic privilege be used in harmony with informed
consent. Without this latter doctrine no transfer of control from the
doctor exists and insurability of the malpractice risk cannot be in-
creased.
I. Statute of Limitations
The second prerequisite to insurability is the ability to measure
with certainty the time, place, and amount of harm."7 One basis of
insurance is the theory that a combination and spreading of similar
54. Comment, Informed Consent: The Illusion of Patient Choice, 23 EMORY
L.J. 503, 513-14 (1974). The privilege would be better used in conjunction with
consent rather than in lieu of it, as was the case in Campbell v. Oliva, 424 F.2d 1244
(6th Cir. 1970), in which the privilege was invoked because physicians feared that
information would lead to refusal of treatment. See also Dunham v. Wright, 423
F.2d 940 (3d Cir. 1970).
55. A doctor may withhold information while obtaining consent if the commu-
nication itself would cause the patient's condition to deteriorate. Nishi v. Hartwell,
52 Hawaii 188, -, 473 P.2d 116, 121 (1970).
56. Comment, Informed Consent: The Illusion of Patient Choice, 23 EMORY
LJ. 503 (1974).




risks will render the probable loss from the risks predictable. 58 A
rate of premium payments to cover the risks can then be determined.
If a hazard cannot be calculated, however, an insurance company
must charge exorbitant premiums to accumulate abundant reserves
for guaranteed protection. A hazard is not capable of approximate
mathematical calculation unless the past is a fair indicator of the
future. 59
Two areas of the law, coupled with rapid progress in the field of
medicine, have made accurate mathematical calculation of loss a
virtual impossibility. The first deals with the statute of limitations in
a medical malpractice action. Although the statute for express con-
tracts is six years, 60 there has been no attempt in Pennsylvania to
apply this period to malpractice actions on an implied contract theo-
ry.61  Rather, the two-year tort statute6 2 has been used for battery
and negligence actions with a one-year limit applied to wrongful
death. 8 This much, at least, has been clear.
58. Id.
Although nothing can be predicted with respect to an individual person
or property or event, the results for a combination of persons, prop-
erties, or events may often be foreseen with considerable accuracy ....
The reduction of uncertainty is the principle benefit of insurance ....
Id. at 24-25.
59. Id. at 31. Catastrophic losses are therefore uninsurable because they result
in unpredictably great losses. Even if predictable, their size would distort the
averaging of other risks. One method of counteracting this effect is to secure an
extremely wide distribution of risks. Id. This is not possible in the field of medical
malpractice due to the relatively small number of those in medical professions and to
the increasing frequency with which awards of catastrophic proportions are made.
60. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 31 (1953). The statute was applied in Shaheen v.
Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (C.P. Lyc. 1957).
61. The absence of attempts to apply the contract statute may be explained by
the presumption that a plaintiff would be limited to recovery of contract damages.
Fala, The Law of Medical Malpractice in Pennsylvania, 36 U. Prrr. L. RE. 203, 231
n.148 (1974). Fala notes, however, that successful attempts were made in several
states, citing Creighton v. Karlin, 225 So. 2d 288 (La. App. 1969) and Hickey v.
Slattery, 103 Conn. 716, 131 A. 558 (1926). In a majority of states in which the
issue has been discussed, it has been held that "the true gist of a malpractice action
is negligence and the tort statute will apply regardless of the stated cause of action."
Fala, supra at 231, citing D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 367
(1973). Case law has indicated that the majority rule would hold in Pennsylvania
by repeatedly saying that "a physician or surgeon is neither a warrantor of a cure
nor a guarantor of the result of his treatment. ... Donaldson v. Maffucci, 397 Pa.
548, 553, 156 A.2d 835, 838 (1959); Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 274, 282
A.2d 206, 213 (1971). This rule became a part of Act 111.
62. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 34 (1953).
63. Id. § 1603. No suit may be instituted if an action by the deceased for the
injury would have been barred. Fala, The Law of Medical Malpractice in Pennsyl-
vania, 36 U. Pir. L. REV. 203, 231 (1974), citing Howard v. Bell Telephone Co.,
306 Pa. 518, 160 A. 613 (1932).
On the other hand, the law governing the point at which the
statute begins to run has long been the subject of heated controversy.
Most jurisdictions have adopted the discovery rule, meaning that the
statute does not begin to run until the patient discovers the wrong or
through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered
it. 4 The rationale for the rule is that medical, especially surgical,
wrongs may not manifest themselves until long after the tort has been
committed. A stricter rule would deny a cause of action to individ-
uals having no means of detecting any harm until long after receiving
the negligent treatment. Affirming this principle in Ayers v. Mor-
gan"5 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated that a surgeon's neg-
ligence begins when the error is committed and continues until it
has been corrected.66
The insurance repercussions of this theory are dramatic. Be-
cause malpractice insurance is sold on an occurrence basis,6 7 a com-
pany must wait years to compute its total losses for any given period.
It is, therefore, impossible to determine future premium and reserve
needs based on past experience. This dilemma is often called the
malpractice "long tail."6 Inflation, constant increase in the number
of claims filed, and rapidly growing damage awards only serve to
aggravate this problem.69 The insurer can only guess at his reserve
needs for long tail claims and, at a time when assets cannot grow or
are reduced by low investment gains, is forced to collect sufficient
premiums to cover losses incurred.
70
64. Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949); Owens v. White, 380 F.2d 310
(9th Cir. 1967); Ragan v. Steen, 229 Pa. Super. 515, 331 A.2d 724 (1974).
65. 397 Pa. 282, 154 A.2d 788 (1959).
66. Id. at 285-86, 154 A.2d at 790.
67. INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT MED-
ICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE 4 (1975). A policy written on an "occurrence" basis
insures a health care provider against losses resulting from services performed in a
given year, regardless of the year in which the claim for that occurrence is filed.
Section 807 of Act 111 permits policies to be written in Pennsylvania on a "claims
made" basis (§ 103 defines "claims made" as "a policy of professional liability
insurance that would limit or restrict the liability of the insurer under the policy to
only those claims made or reported during the currency of the policy period and
would exclude coverage for claims reported subsequent to the termination even when
such claims resulted from occurrences during the currency of the policy period"), but
only if the insurer guarantees to the Pennsylvania Insurance Commissioner that
suitable liability protection will be available subsequent to the discontinuance of
professional practice "for so long as there is a reasonable probability of a claim for
injury for which the health care provider may be held liable." This stipulation
concerning availability means only that physicians will be purchasing the same
amount of coverage as would be provided by an "occurrence" policy, but that the cost
of coverage will be spread over a number of years. Unfortunately, the last of those
years will be during the physician's retirement-a non-income producing period. It
would therefore seem that in the long run the costs will be the same for both
companies and health care providers, but that the price will be paid in a period during
which it can be less easily afforded by providers.





Act 111 continued the existence of the long tail, 71 but the
legislature had no other choice.7 Maintenance of the discovery rule
recognizes the fundamental unfairness of requiring an individual to
seek his remedy before his injury manifests itself.7 8  The legislature
did more, however, than merely incorporate old law. It also provided
that awards made as a result of actions commenced more than four
years after the alleged harmful occurrence will be paid from the
Catastrophe Loss Fund.74  This provision affects only the source of
money that must be available to pay claims, not the amount. It, thus,
evidences an attempt to reduce the need for private insurance compa-
nies' large reserves and to allow premium reduction. The total
amount of possible loss, however, has been made no more certain and
the overall insurability of the malpractice risk remains unimproved.
In fact, shifting the burden may defeat the basic purpose of Act 111.
The Catastrophe Loss Fund is composed of the proceeds of an
annual surcharge levied on all health care providers. The charge
is the greater of ten percent of the health care provider's insurance
71. Act of Oct. 15, 1975, P.L. -, No. 111, § 605 (compiled at PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 40, § 1301.605 (Supp. 1976)).
72. "All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done him in his
lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law".
PA. CON ST. art. I, § 11.
Statutes of limitations must be read in light of this provision for the
running of time is not the only test of validity of such statutes .... [Rie-
strictions imposed may not be so arbitrary as to preclude a reasonable op-
portunity for one who has been harmed to make his claim . . . . [C]ourts
. . . do have power. . . to interpret the statutes so as to include an essen-
tial requirement which would make its application constitutional.
Ayers v. Morgan, 397 Pa. 282, 295-96, 154 A.2d 788, 794-95 (1959) (concurring
opinion). Justice McBride concluded that without the discovery rule, the statute of
limitations would be unconstitutional if applied to harm not immediately detectable.
Id. at 296, 154 A.2d at 795.
73. Note, The Discovery Rule Extended in Oregon, 6 WILLAMETrE L.J. 327
(1970). The purpose of statutes of limitations is the protection of citizens from
"stale and vexacious claims by precluding litigation after the lapse of a reasonable
time." Id. at 331, citing Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126 (1938).
A claim is not stale at least until injury should have been detected.
74. Act 111 requires all health care providers subject to the provisions of the
act to purchase professional liability insurance in the amount of $100,000 per
occurrence and $300,000 per annual aggregate and limits the liability of the insurer to
this amount. In order to pay awards in excess of $100,000, the Medical Professional
Liability Catastrophe Loss Fund was created. The fund's limits of liability are
$1,000,000 per occurrence and $3,000,000 per annual aggregate. The fund is com-
posed of the proceeds of an annual surcharge levied on health care providers. The
amount of the surcharge is subject to approval by the Insurance Commissioner, but
shall not exceed ten percent of the provider's annual professional liability insurance
premium or one hundred dollars, whichever is greater. Act of Oct. 15, 1975, P.L. -,
No. 111, § 701 (compiled at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.701 (Supp. 1976)).
premium or one hundred dollars.7 5  Both special and general hos-
pitals, however, can exempt themselves from the duty to contribute
merely by purchasing one million dollars of insurance. 76  Thus, the
burden of maintaining the fund rests with other health care provid-
ers who probably have fewer assets.
More importantly, the fund has only two years to accumulate
more than seven-and-one-half million dollars in assets. After two
years it must be large enough to pay the costs of all claims made
against it in any single year without dipping below the seven-and-one-
half million mark.7 7 Because there are only about 20,000 contributors
to the fund7 8 and because insurance premiums are likely to decrease
if only three hundred thousand dollars of coverage need be pur-
chased annually, 79 the probability that the fund will ever reach the
necessary level has been challenged by actuaries.8 0 According to
section 703 of the Act, if the fund drops below seven-and-one-half
million any time after the second annual surcharge and the general
assembly refuses to take remedial action within seventy-five days,
the fund will cease to be liable for claims not already existing against
it. In addition, the Joint Underwriting Association (JUA)s ' also will
terminate. The fund, however, will continue to be liable for existing
claims and its director is authorized to levy an unlimited surcharge
on health care providers to cover their cost. In essence, the health
care providers' liability will have been postponed to a time of in-
creased costs, not reduced.82 Furthermore, because the JUA will
75. Id. § 701(d) (compiled at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.701(d) (Supp.
1976)).
76. Id. § 701(a) (compiled at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.701(a) (Supp.
1976)).
77. Id. § 703 (compiled at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.703 (Supp. 1976)).
78. Interview with Otis Littleton, Member of the 1006 Joint Committee on
Medical Malpractice, in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, February 17, 1976. Section 1006
of Act 111 of 1975 created this committee to study the distribution of insurance costs
among health care providers and to report its findings to the Pennsylvania General
Assembly.
79. Id. It has not yet been established whether the health care provider's
liability is limited to the total that his insurer and the Catastrophe Loss Fund are
obligated to pay, or whether providers must purchase "umbrella liability coverage" in
excess of $1,100,000 to protect against catastrophic losses. Prior Pennsylvania law
suggests that, with the exception of workmen's compensation, the legislature cannot
limit a claimant's recovery. The premium fluctuation will probably be much less in
the event that such umbrella coverage must be purchased.
80. Interview with Otis Littleton, Member of the 1006 Joint Committee on
Medical Malpractice, in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, February 17, 1976.
81. Article VIII of Act 111 of 1975 authorizes creation of a Joint Underwrit-
ing Association to insure availability of medical professional liability insurance. All
insurers authorized to write insurance in Pennsylvania must participate in the plan,
which "shall provide for equitable appointment of the financial burdens of insurance
provided to applicants under the plan and the costs of operation of the plan among all
participating insurers .... " Act of Oct. 15, 1975, P.L. -, No. 111, § 802 (com-
piled at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.802 (Supp. 1976)).
82. The unlimited surcharge may produce a worse crisis than that which
precipitated Act 111. In the event of significant claims existing against the Cata-
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also terminate, one of the essentials of the Act 111 program will be
destroyed. The real problem of insurability having been disguised
rather than dealt with, insurance companies no longer forced to
write policies in Pennsylvania will leave. If any remain, their scarcity
will produce the same high premium crisis that existed prior to Act
111.
Certainty and insurability, therefore, have not been increased by
the general assembly's incorporation of existing statutes of limitation.
This is, however, inevitable. Both the constitution and public policy
mandate that no person should be deprived of his right to recover
damages from one who has harmed him. In trying to remove the
burden of delayed claims from insurance companies, the legislature
has only disguised the problems inherent in the malpractice statute of
limitations.
IV. Arbitration
The second area of the law that contributes to great uncertainty
in loss computation and results in occasional catastrophic losses
of a financial nature8" is the use of trial by jury as a forum for
judging malpractice and awarding damages. Both delay in the
adjudication of claims and unpredictability in the size of verdicts are
inherent in the jury system. To eliminate verdicts based on emotion-
alism, prejudice, or irrationality and to create a speedier and more
efficient forum, a system of compulsory but nonbinding arbitration
was included in Act 111. Analysis of this system first focuses on the
degree to which it can accomplish the desired goals. Assuming the
system is or can be made workable, the discussion next focuses on the
legal merits of arbitration and the desirability of alterations in the
current procedures.
Advocates of arbitration cite as its primary advantages the
speedy adjudication of claims,84 lower costs,85 and feedback to the
health industry that will weed incompetents from the profession.86
strophic Loss Fund, the health care providers themselves have assumed a new
obligation-unlimited liability in the amount of what would have been the insurance
industry's total loss cost. Interview with Otis Littleton, Member of the 1006 Joint
Committee on Medical Malpractice, in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, February 17, 1976.
83. See note 59 and accompanying text supra.
84. Baker, Proposal for a Medical Malpractice Arbitration Plan Using Cleve-
land, Ohio as a Model, 1972 INs. L.J. 625, 626.
85. Id.
86. Id., citing Bernzweig, The Malpractice Claims System: A Conceptual
Model, unpublished, at 3.
Increased speed comes chiefly from the enabling legislation itself.87
Arbitration rules can eliminate many of the time lags found in the
judicial system because procedural and evidentiary rules are relaxed
enough that parties need not spend vast amounts of time preparing
for complex presentation of a case. This is especially true with
regard to the securing and detailed examination and cross-examina-
tion of expert witnesses. 8  The same relaxation that contributes
to speedy adjudications also can result in lower litigation costs.
Fees for attorneys, doctors, and witnesses can all be reduced. Fewer
expensive experts are needed, more evidence can be presented by
affidavit, tape recording, or videotape, and there is generally no need
for expensive court reporters.8 9 Many arbitration plans provide for
continued use of a small group of arbitrators with experience in the
malpractice field.90 This practice tends to lessen the unpredictability
of awards and increase certainty of loss totals. Experienced arbitra-
tors develop a heightened ability to grasp complex medical problems
and have a lesser tendency to be affected by theatrics and emotional-
ism.
These benefits have the potential for increasing the insurability
of the malpractice risk by making the cost of claims not only more
certain but slightly lower. Unfortunately, most of these attractive
features are absent from Act 111. The lack of emotionalism and
high level of objectivity from which an arbitration system could
benefit have been greatly reduced by Pennsylvania's requirement that
each arbitration panel be virgin.91 Thus, the opportunity for an
arbitrator's experience to enhance his ability to understand complex
problems and to see through emotional appeals is nonexistent. The
three lay members of the panel are the equivalent of three jurors. An
effort was made in section 308(b) to contribute expertise to each
panel by requiring the presence of two attorneys and two health care
providers. Section 308(b) fails to guarantee any true medical exper-
tise, however, because only when a claim concerns a hospital adminis-
trator, podiatrist, or osteopath is a member of that profession required
to serve on the panel. Only for these three classes, then, does Act
111 guarantee expertise.9 2 Even if the same guarantee were extend-
87. See, e.g., Baker, Proposal for a Medical Malpractice Arbitration Plan Using
Cleveland, Ohio as a Model, 1972 INs. L.J. 625 (describing a plan in which the
American Arbitration Association administers arbitrations according to the Commer-
cial Rules of the American Arbitration Association (June 1, 1974)).
88. Id. at 628-29.
89. Id., citing Center for The Study of Democratic Institutions, Medical Mal-
practice (Donald McDonald, ed., Nov. 1971), at 9.
90. See, e.g., plan described in Ludlan & Hassard, Arbitration, 44 HosPrrALS 58
(1970).
91. Act of Oct. 15, 1975, P.L. -, No. 11, § 308(a) (compiled at PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.308(a) (Supp. 1976)).




ed to all malpractice defendants, the system might still invite preju-
dice. Objectivity in both lay persons and experts could better have
been achieved had the Act provided for regional panels whose mem-
bers serve for set terms.9
An added danger of partiality is present in the procedure
through which panel members are chosen. The Act states only that
"panel candidates shall be selected from a pool of candidates generat-
ed by the administrator."94  Absent restrictions on sources of candi-
dates, their qualifications, or the minimum size of the pool, a possibil-
ity exists that the candidates who form that pool will be political
choices of the Administrator. In addition, the very complex nature
of a malpractice proceeding will cause the number of eligible people
to be members of a relatively small group who can afford to leave
their regular employment for days at a time. 5 The Pennsylvania
procedure, therefore, places both the advantages of expertise and
objectivity in jeopardy. Consequently, the probability of more pre-
dictable awards is diminished.
Likewise, Act 111 fails to reduce the substantial procedural
costs incident to malpractice litigation or to distribute them through-
out the Commonwealth. Although each panel has the duty to "expe-
ditiously hear and determine"9 6 the claim before it, complex proce-
dural rules hinder achievement of this goal. The panel is "bound by
Hager, November 26, 1975. Although the last sentence of subsection (b) attempts to
insure wherever possible that one of the health care providers be of the same class as
the defendant, it is possible that two nurses could be appointed as the health care
provider arbitrators or an administrator and a physical therapist could ,be so ap-
pointed when a physician is a defendant. Since the last sentence does not specifically
list physicians as one of the classes entitled to be represented on the arbitration
panel, the obvious intent of subsection (b) could be avoided.
93. Prior to senate amendment, the house version so provided.
94. Act of Oct. 15, 1975, P.L. -, No. 111, § 308(c) (compiled at PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.308(c) (Supp. 1976)).
95. Further, a question can be raised as to where, in a complex malprac-
tice case, one will find two health care providers who may be in a position
to give up 1, 2 or 3 weeks of their time for the purposes of a hearing. The
same comment can be made with respect to the attorneys and the three lay
persons. In the complex case, it would appear almost certain that only per-
sons who would have such time available will be people who are not en-
gaged in private business activities which would make substantial demands
on their time. The size of the panel and the possibility of a lengthy hearing
in the complex malpractice case would tend to indicate that the cost of
the arbitration will be substantial, particularly in view of the provision of
per diem compensation for arbitration panel members.
Memorandum from Seymour J. Schafer to Pennsylvania Senator Henry Hager,
November 26, 1975.
96. Act of Oct. 15, 1975, P.L. -, No. 11, § 402 (compiled at PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 40, § 1301.402 (Supp. 1976)).
the common and statutory law of the Commonwealth, the Pennsyl-
vania Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Pennsylvania Rules of Evi-
dence." 7  Without any relaxation in the required procedures, the
costs incurred and time spent in arbitration will approach the level of
those accompanying a jury trial. Furthermore, witnesses, attorneys,
and arbitrators retained for long periods of time will receive substan-
tial compensation. These heavy administrative costs will be paid
by health care providers, the group currently suffering most from the
malpractice crisis.9"
Only two provisions99 in the Act are aimed directly toward
reducing awards and even their effectiveness must be questioned.
Section 602 reduces an award "under this act" by subtracting from it
public collateral sources of compensation and benefits. Section 604
limits attorneys' fees to thirty percent of the first one hundred thou-
sand dollars recovered, twenty-five percent of the second hundred
thousand dollars, and twenty percent of anything above two hundred
thousand dollars. The method for computing these limits, however,
is not described in the Act.
[A] question arises as to whether the reduction is limited to
benefits received as of the date of the award or whether future
benefits which may be received by the patient are to be set off
and, if so, what protections are there to be where the extent
of the future benefits are subject to change and cannot be deter-
mined with certainty at the time of the award. Finally, the right
of reduction applies to 'damages awarded under this act.' Does
this limit the reduction to loss established through the arbitration
procedures only, since the very use of the term 'award' is one
which is more appropriate in connection with an arbitration-type
proceeding rather than 'verdict' which results from a judicial-
type proceeding. Further, since the right of recovery in a jury
trial already exists, it may be argued that damages awarded on
the trial de novo are not damages awarded under this act.' 00
Similar questions have arisen with regard to section 604. This
section, when read with section 602, raises a question whether the
limitation on contingent fees applies only to a recovery made under
the arbitration proceeding. Furthermore, does application of the for-
97. Id. § 506 (compiled at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.506 (Supp. 1976)).
98. Id. § 304 (compiled at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.304 (Supp. 1976)).
99. Reduction of Award by Other Benefits.-The loss and damages
awarded under this act shall be reduced by any public collateral source of
compensation or benefits. A right of subrogation is not enforceable against
any benefit or compensation awarded under this act or against any health
care provider or its liability insurer.
Id. § 602 (compiled at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.602 (Supp. 1976)).
Attorney's Fees.-(a) When a plaintiff is represented by an attorney in the
prosecution of his claim the plaintiff's attorney fees from any award made
from the first $100,000 may not exceed 30%, from the second $100,000
attorney fees may not exceed 25% and attorney fees may not exceed 20o
on the balance of any award.
Id. § 604 (compiled at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.604 (Supp. 1976)).
100. Memorandum from Seymour J. Schafer to Pennsylvania Senator Henry
Hager, November 26, 1975.
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mula on contingent fees apply to the award before or after reduction
under section 602? Is the total award recorded, the contingent fee
limitation applied, and the reduction for collateral source benefits
then applied to result in the net amount received by the patient? Or,
in the alternative, is the reduction of collateral source benefits made
from the gross award, leaving an adjusted gross against which
the contingent fee limitation is applied? 10 1
Even assuming that arbitration will result in lower and more
predictable malpractice awards, insurance costs will not be reduced
unless plaintiffs are prevented from appealing as a matter of course to
a common pleas court for a jury trial, in which the risk of runaway
verdicts is prevalent. Sections 309 and 509 of Act 111 deal with the
jurisdiction of arbitration panels and appeals from panel decisions to
the common pleas courts. Because these sections leave unaltered the
pre-Act standard of when a cause of action accrues, plaintiffs with
diversity of citizenship can escape the mandatory arbitration require-
ment by commencing their action in federal district court.'0 2  The
benefits of a full court proceeding, as well as the opportunity to avoid
the collateral source and contingent fee provisions of article VI, make
this alternative palatable to plaintiffs and counsel alike.
Act 111 does successfully place certain obstacles in the path of a
plaintiff who initially submits his claim to arbitration. First, the
arbitration proceeding so closely resembles a jury trial in terms of
time and cost that the procedural advantages of a court trial are
minimal. In addition, the jury in the so-called de novo proceeding
will not be free from prejudice. Section 510 provides that the
findings of fact and decision of the arbitration panel shall be admissi-
ble as evidence. Inevitably this evidence will weigh heavily with the
jury.10 3  Even if a claimant believes he can secure a higher recovery
101. Id.
102. If in addition Articles VI and VII do not extend to rights of action
in the United States District Court, then it would appear that a dual insur-
ance system will be required to protect any health care provider who is
likely to render professional services to a non-resident of Pennsylvania,
thereby exposing himself to claims which may be prosecuted in the United
States District Court under diversity of citizenship. If, in fact, a dual in-
surance system is required, serious doubts exist as to whether any cost sav-
ings will be effected or, conversely, it would appear that a dual system will
ultimately involve dual expenses which will be far in excess of the present
costs of resolving malpractice claims.
Id.
103. The supposedly impartial jury is being supplied with evidence in the form of
conclusions drawn by those who are naturally most prejudiced. Interview with
in court, prior to instituting proceedings he must pay all record
costs."°4 Finally, if the court of common pleas finds that the appeal
was capricious, frivolous, and unreasonable, the appellant will be
liable for all costs of arbitration and trial, including record costs,
arbitrators' compensation, discovery costs, and fees and expenses of
the arbitration panel's expert witnesses. 105
These provisions should effectively deter appeals of small and
moderate claims. Larger claims, however, in which the plaintiff has
at least a modicum of favorable evidence, are still likely to be ap-
pealed. In these cases the appeal costs dim in comparison to the
potential verdict. Juries will continue, therefore, to judge those
claims most likely to result in runaway verdicts. The mandatory
arbitration requirement of Act 111 is far from a guaranteed cure for
the malpractice crisis.
V. Conclusion
A survey of the malpractice insurance crisis reveals not only that
the cost of insurance is rapidly increasing, but also that the sources of
insurance are scarce. The lack of competition in writing policies in-
dicates that the business is unprofitable and that the malpractice risk
at present is virtually uninsurable. To alleviate this crisis in Pennsyl-
vania, the general assembly passed Act 111 of 1975. The Act's
success depends on whether the insurability of the malpractice risk
has been increased to a level with which private carriers are able to
deal.
The two major prerequisites to insurability are fortuitousness
and certainty of loss. Act 11 attempts to alter certain legal princi-
ples fundamental to the malpractice action to increase these elements
and heighten insurability. The most criticized principles addressed
by the Act are the doctrine of informed consent, the applicable
statutes of limitation, and the use of the jury trial as a forum for claim
adjudication.
Alterations to the doctrine of informed consent should have been
aimed chiefly toward increasing the fortuitousness of loss. Act 111
codified the reasonable patient standard of consent. Control over an
William Archbold, Esq., Past President of the Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers Associa-
tion, in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, August, 1975.
104. Act of Oct. 15, 1975, P.L. -, No. 111, § 509 (compiled at PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 40, § 1301.509 (Supp. 1976)).
105. Id.
Furthermore, with respect to that portion of 509 which permits the as-
sessment of costs and expenses for capricious, frivolous, and unreasonable
appeals, the act is silent as to when and how the determination is made and
by whom, that is, by the trial judge, the jury, or an independent proceeding
before another trier of facts.





individual's body, thus, is placed with that individual. A patient who
has faced the consequences of his own decisions is less likely to claim
damages than one who has unwillingly submitted himself to another's
control. This standard, however, had already been adopted judicially
in Pennsylvania. Codification, therefore, was not an improvement.
Unfortunately, a vague therapeutic privilege not previously estab-
lished as a valid exception in Pennsylvania was also codified. Regu-
lations must be adopted pursuant to the Act to circumscribe this
exception carefully. Otherwise, the general rule can be easily avoid-
ed and the degree of fortuitousness the doctrine had contributed prior
to Act 111 lessened.
Changes in the applicable statutes of limitation and the jury
process were advocated to increase the certainty of time, place, and
amount of loss. Despite interest group pressure Act 111 incorporat-
ed all existing statutes of limitation including the controversial discov-
ery rule. No substantive changes in this rule or its effect on insura-
bility were added. The responsibility to pay claims greater than
four years old, however, was diverted from private carriers to the
Catastrophe Loss Fund. Unfortunately, actuarial projections indicate
that this provision is unlikely to alleviate the problem of unpredict-
ably high costs. Instead, it will probably have an adverse impact on
costs to the medical community. Although any substantial changes
in the statutes of limitations were impossible, 10 6 the minor changes
the legislature did make are unlikely to create any improvement.
They sugarcoat, rather than correct, the real problem. Finally, the
availability and procedure of the jury trial were altered in an effort to
reduce costs and increase certainty by avoiding the possibility of
runaway verdicts. The introduction of a mandatory arbitration sys-
tem presented the best opportunity to improve the malpractice risk.
The current alterations, however, show little chance of accomplish-
ing this goal.
Thus, efforts to cure the medical malpractice crisis by amending
applicable legal doctrines in all probability will have little effect on
the nature of the risk. Unless the medical profession can successfully
remove the incompetents from within its ranks, it appears certain the
crisis will remain. In the near future the legislature will be forced
to adopt a new system of compensation to meet the uninsurable risk
or to abandon legal principles that to this point have been considered
fundamental to the just disposition of claims.
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